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ABSTRACT 
 
The recent rise of non-practicing patentees (NPPs) in the 
clean technology space comes at a time when the 
international community is debating the role of intellectual 
property rights in the deployment and implementation of 
technologies to combat climate change.  While the impact of 
intellectual property rights on the deployment of clean 
technology has been studied, less attention has been given to 
the role intellectual property regimes play in maintaining the 
operation of those technologies already deployed in the fight 
against global warming.  This iBrief focuses on clean 
technologies that have already achieved substantial market 
penetration and observes that recent trends in patent law are, 
to a large extent, allowing those technologies to continue 
working to reduce carbon emissions.  Specifically, the course 
correction in the law of patent injunctions brought about by 
eBay v. MercExchange and the endorsement of court-
imposed ongoing royalty payments in Paice v. Toyota 
demonstrate an important shift in patent law that is tempering 
the impact of clean tech NPPs in Title 35 infringement 
actions in federal courts.  However, these trends have caused 
a tactical adjustment by clean tech NPPs—namely, filing suits 
in the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), where the 
remedy of an exclusion order is available.  These ITC cases 
could adversely affect implemented clean technologies.  
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 A sure sign that a technology space is maturing is the advent 
of infringement actions by NPPs.  These individuals, patent-holding 
companies or other non-practicing patent holders—often derided as 
patent “trolls”—do not commercialize their patented technology but 
                                                 
1 Eric L. Lane is a patent attorney in San Diego and the founder and author of 
Green Patent Blog, which covers intellectual property issues in clean technology.   
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instead generate revenue through licensing.  They approach firms 
they believe to be manufacturing or selling embodiments of their 
patented technology and use the threat of infringement suits as a stick 
in negotiations.   
¶2 So it is in clean technology: the clean tech patent “trolls” have 
arrived.  Their presence is being felt by major green-tech 
implementers, particularly in the hybrid vehicle space, in energy-
efficient lighting technologies such as light-emitting diodes (LEDs) 
and, most recently, by utilities and companies developing and 
deploying smart grid technologies. 
¶3 The rise of NPPs in clean technologies coincides with a 
renewed sense of urgency in deploying such technologies to combat 
climate change.   While the impact of intellectual property rights on 
the deployment and implementation of clean technology has been 
studied, less attention has been given to the roles that intellectual 
property regimes play in maintaining the operation of such 
technologies already deployed and functioning to fight global 
warming.   
¶4 This iBrief focuses on clean technologies that are making an 
impact because they have already achieved substantial market 
penetration.  This iBrief also observes that recent trends in patent law 
allow those technologies to further reduce carbon emissions.  
Specifically, the course correction on patent injunctions brought 
about by eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.2 and the endorsement 
and operation of court-awarded ongoing royalty payments in Paice, 
L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp.3
I. EBAY AND THE NON-PRACTICING PATENTEE 
 demonstrates an important shift in 
patent law.  Some clean tech NPPs have changed tactics as a result 
and turned to the ITC where the eBay ruling does not apply and the 
remedy of an importation ban is available.  However, in patent 
infringement actions in federal courts, this shift in the law is 
tempering the impact of clean tech NPPs and keeping the LEDs on 
and the electric motors running.  
¶5 In eBay, the U.S. Supreme Court—reversing long-standing 
Federal Circuit precedent that patent infringement automatically 
                                                 
2 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
3 504 F.3d 1293, 1296–97 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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triggers injunctive relief—held that district courts must first employ 
the traditional four-factor equitable test before issuing a permanent 
injunction under the Patent Act.4  An important concurrence written 
by Justice Kennedy (joined by Stevens, Souter and Breyer) noted the 
recent trend of NPP litigation and reasoned that it may change the 
calculus for the permanent injunction analysis.5  The concurring 
justices observed that, in the case of an NPP, “the economic function 
of the patent holder present[s] considerations quite unlike earlier 
cases.”6  Kennedy concluded that legal damages are likely to be 
sufficient in NPP litigation, where “the threat of an injunction is 
employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations.”7
¶6  In the wake of eBay, there has been some significant clean 
tech patent litigation involving NPPs. The in- and out-of-court results 
of these cases have been heavily shaped by the new eBay 
requirements.  This change in patent law, brought about by eBay, 
helps to combat climate change by allowing important clean 
technologies to remain in the market.  Three examples are hybrid 
vehicles, energy-efficient lighting technologies, particularly LEDs, 
and smart grid technology. 
 
II. INFRINGING ICON 
A. A Hybrid Vehicle Startup Takes on an Icon 
¶7 Toyota is the acknowledged leader in the hybrid car industry.8  
In 2006—the year the eBay decision came down—the Prius 
accounted for more than 40% of hybrid sales in the U.S.  By April 
2008, the Prius went platinum, with a worldwide sales figure 
exceeding one million.9
                                                 
4 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391–92. 
  The EPA reports that the 2010 Prius was the 
5 Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring)  (“An industry has developed in which firms 
use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for 
obtaining licensing fees.”). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 396. 
8 See Hybrid Sales Figures/Tax Credits for Hybrids, ELECTRIC DRIVE TRANSP. 
ASS’N, 
http://www.electricdrive.org/index.php?ht=d/Articles/cat_id/5514/pid/2549 (last 
visited Aug. 27, 2010). 
9 See One Million Priuses Sold, MATTER NETWORK (May 16, 2008), 
http://www.matternetwork.com/2008/5/one-million-toyotas-sold.cfm. 
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most fuel-efficient car available of its model year.10  As of September 
2009, cumulative global sales of Toyota hybrid vehicles hit the two 
million mark.11  Toyota estimates the net effect of its hybrid vehicle 
sales, which are dominated by the Prius, has been an 11 million ton 
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions.12
¶8 Toyota was not first to develop hybrid gas-electric automotive 
technology.  Dr. Severinsky and his startup company, Paice L.L.C., 
began developing power trains for hybrid gas-electric vehicles in the 
early 1990s.
 
13  From the start, Paice impressed the academic and 
investment communities.  The University of Maryland incubator 
program for promising startup companies accepted Paice shortly after 
its inception.14  The company also received a capital infusion of $19 
million from a private foundation.15
¶9    Paice filed a patent application on its hybrid vehicle 
technology in 1992.
  
16
¶10 Paice’s early patent application was directed to a hybrid 
electric vehicle in which the drive train uses a microprocessor and a 
  The invention addressed the problem of 
combining power from gas and electric sources in hybrid vehicles.  In 
conventional cars, the wheels are driven by torque, or rotational 
force, supplied by an internal combustion engine (ICE).  In hybrid 
gas-electric vehicles, torque is supplied by a combination of an ICE 
and an electric motor.  A hybrid drive train must be able to combine 
and control the relative torque contributions of an ICE and an electric 
motor.   
                                                 
10 See Most and Least Efficient Fuel Efficient Vehicles, FUELECONOMY.GOV, 
http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/best/bestworstNF.shtml (last visited Aug. 27, 
2010). 
11 Toyota Press Release, Worldwide Sales of Toyota Motor Corp. Hybrids Top 2 
Million Units, available at http://media.toyota.ca/pr/tci/en/worldwide-sales-of-
toyota-motor-101335.aspx (Sep. 4, 2009). 
12 See id. (“As of August 31, 2009, TMC calculates that TMC hybrid vehicles, since 
1997, have led to approximately 11 million fewer tons of CO2 emissions—
considered to be a cause of global warming—than would have been emitted by 
gasoline-powered vehicles of similar size and driving performance.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
13 See Brief in Opposition for Paice, LLC at 2, Toyota Motor Corp. v. Paice, LLC, 
504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (No. 07-1120) (May 12, 2008), 2008 WL 877884 at 
*2 [hereinafter Brief in Opposition]. 
14 Id. at 3. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 2. 
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controllable torque transfer unit (CTTU) that accepts torque input 
from both the ICE and the electric motor.17  The microprocessor 
controls the amount of torque provided by the ICE and the electric 
motor by locking or releasing a bevel gear assembly and holding 
torque inputs constant.18  The application issued in 1994 as U.S. 
Patent No. 5,343,970 (the ‘970 Patent), with one key claim limitation 
reciting that the CTTU provides controllable and variable amounts of 
torque from two sources (the ICE and the electric motor) to the drive 
wheels.19
¶11  The following year, Toyota initiated its first project to bring 
hybrid vehicles to mass production, resulting in the launch of the first 
generation Prius (Prius I) in Japan in 1997.
 
20  After the Prius I was 
launched in the U.S. in 2000, Paice invited Toyota to attend a 
demonstration of its patented hybrid vehicle system.21  Toyota 
representatives attended the demonstration, but ignored Paice’s 
subsequent offers to license the technology.22  Although Toyota 
acknowledged that Paice had “made great developments in the hybrid 
field,” the automaker declined to take a license because it had “no 
intentions of developing [Paice’s] technology.”23
¶12 In 2002, Paice approached Toyota again, sending the 
automaker a copy of an industry presentation and proposing a 
meeting.
   
24  Once again, Toyota acknowledged that Paice’s system 
showed “excellent performance,” but refused to meet.25  In 2003, 
Toyota rebuffed additional overtures from Paice.26
¶13 Toyota introduced the second generation Prius (Prius II) in 
2003.  In the following year, Paice sued the automaker in the Eastern 
District of Texas, alleging that the Prius II, the Toyota Highlander 
 
                                                 
17 Paice, LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he 
drive train disclosed in the ‘970 patent employs a microprocessor and a controllable 
torque transfer unit (“CTTU”) that accepts torque input from both the ICE and the 
electric motor.”). 
18 Id. at 1297. 
19 See U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970 col.23 l.59–68 (filed Sept. 21, 1992). 
20 See Brief in Opposition, supra note 12, at 3–4. 
21 See id. at 4. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. at 5. 
25 See Brief in Opposition, supra note 12, at 5. 
26 Id. 
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and the Lexus RX400h sport utility vehicle infringed three Paice 
patents, including the ‘970 patent.27
¶14 Like Paice’s patented system, the Toyota hybrid drive train 
also combines torque from an ICE with torque from an electric 
motor.
   
28  However, instead of bevel gears, the Toyota system has a 
“planetary” gear unit with a central “sun” gear that meshes with 
several planetary gears, which in turn meshes with a peripheral ring 
gear.29  The output shaft from the ICE is connected to the planetary 
gears, but the output shaft from the electric motor is connected to the 
ring gear, instead of both output shafts connecting to the same 
structure.30
¶15 These technical distinctions lead to a split verdict on 
infringement.  In December 2005, a jury found that the accused 
vehicles did not literally infringe Paice’s patents, but did infringe two 
claims of the ‘970 patent under the doctrine of equivalents.
   
31  The 
jury awarded approximately $4.3 million in past damages and an 
ongoing royalty of $25 per infringing vehicle.32
B. Injunction Denied Under eBay 
 
¶16 Having succeeded on infringement, Paice moved for a 
permanent injunction.33  Less than a month after the hearing on the 
injunction motion (and before the district court ruled on the motion), 
the Supreme Court handed down the eBay decision.  The district 
court was now bound to conduct the traditional four-factor analysis. 34
¶17 To be awarded a permanent injunction, Paice had to 
demonstrate:  
 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available 
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for 
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the 
                                                 
27 See Paice, 504 F.3d at 1300–01. 
28 Id. at 1299. 
29 Id. 
30 See id. at 1299–1300. 
31 See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600, at *3 (E.D. 
Tex. Aug. 16, 2006). 
32 Paice, 504 F.3d at 1302–03. 
33 See Paice, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600, at *1. 
34 See id. at *1–3 (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839–
41). 
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plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that 
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.35
¶18 The district court held that Paice failed to establish irreparable 
harm, rejecting the argument that its licensing efforts were hampered 
by the lack of injunctive relief.
 
36  The court found no evidence that 
Paice’s inability to successfully license its technology was due to the 
absence of an injunction.37  The court also noted that, due to Paice’s 
licensing business model, the company did not compete with Toyota 
for market share or brand recognition.38
¶19 As to the second factor, the court cited eBay for the 
proposition that infringing a patentee’s right to exclude alone is 
insufficient to warrant injunctive relief and found that monetary relief 
would vindicate Paice’s patent rights.
 
39  The court rejected Paice’s 
contention that the infringement claims covered “the heart of what the 
Prius is all about.”40  Somewhat counterintuitively, the court instead 
held that the infringement claims, which relate to the hybrid 
transmissions of the vehicles, form only a small aspect of the overall 
vehicles.41  In this regard, the court relied upon the jury’s damages 
award and reasonable royalty rate, which indicated that the 
infringement claims constitute a very small part (twenty -five dollars) 
of the value of the vehicle as a whole.42  The court also noted that 
Paice continued to extend licensing offers to Toyota throughout post-
trial motions, which further demonstrated that Paice viewed monetary 
relief as adequate.43
¶20 The court found the balance of hardships weighed against 
enjoining Toyota because of the likely damage to the automaker’s 
 
                                                 
35 Paice, 2006 U.S.Dist Lexis 61600, at *3–4 (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 391). 
36 See Paice, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600, at *12–13. 
37 Id. 
38 See id. at *14. 
39 See id. at *14–15. 
40 See id. at *15 (“[T]he Court disagrees with Plaintiff regarding the import of the 
two claims found infringed to the accused vehicles as a whole.  The infringed 
claims relate to the hybrid transmissions of the accused vehicles, but form only a 
small aspect of the overall vehicles.”). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at *16 (citation omitted) (“It is also of note that Plaintiff, throughout post-trial 
motions, has extended Defendants an offer to license its technology.  This offer 
further demonstrates the adequacy of monetary relief from Plaintiff’s point of 
view.”). 
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business and related businesses.44  According to the court, Paice’s 
assertion that it would face extinction absent an injunction and 
Toyota would experience only minor economic losses if enjoined 
ignores the reality of the economic situation surrounding the accused 
vehicles.45  Specifically, the court found that an injunction would 
likely interrupt Toyota’s business and related businesses, such as 
dealers and suppliers.46  More broadly, the court stated that the 
“burgeoning hybrid market” could be stifled by an injunction because 
of development costs.47
¶21 With regard to the final factor, the court concluded that the 
public interest favors neither party.
 
48  While the court acknowledged 
the long-recognized public interest in enforcing patent rights, it noted 
that this interest is served by non-injunctive relief such as monetary 
damages.49  The court specifically rejected Toyota’s argument that an 
injunction would be contrary to the public interest in reducing 
American dependence on foreign oil.50  The court noted that Toyota’s 
hybrid vehicles are not the only products of their kind on the market, 
and that there was no evidence that U.S. demand for hybrid vehicles 
could not be met by hybrid alternatives made by other automobile 
manufacturers.51
¶22 This leaves open the possibility that reducing dependence on 
foreign oil could satisfy the public interest factor if the availability of 
alternative products is limited.  Perhaps a court would deny an 
injunction in a case where a product in an immature clean technology 
space with limited or no alternative or substitute products infringed a 
patent. 
 
                                                 
44 Id. (“[T]wo of the accused vehicles were introduced to the market during the 
2006 model year and enjoining their sales will likely interrupt not only Defendants’ 
business but that of related businesses, such as dealers and suppliers.”). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at *17. 
49 Id. at *16–17. 
50 Id. at *17 (“Insofar as Defendants argue that an injunction would be contrary to 
the public interest in reducing dependence of foreign oil, the Court finds this 
argument unavailing.”). 
51 Id. 
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¶23 The district court concluded that the factors as a whole 
favored Toyota and therefore denied the injunction.52  However, 
instead of leaving the parties to negotiate a license going forward, the 
court ordered an ongoing royalty of $25 per infringing vehicle.53
Defendants are hereby ORDERED, for the remaining life of the ‘970 
patent, to pay Plaintiff an ongoing royalty of $25.00 per infringing 
Prius II, Toyota Highlander, or Lexis RX400H (the ‘infringing 
vehicles’).
  The 
order stated, in relevant part that 
54
 
 
C. The Federal Circuit Endorses an Ongoing Royalty 
¶24 Both parties appealed the infringement verdict.55  The Federal 
Circuit upheld the jury verdict of no literal infringement because 
Toyota’s product lacked elements of Paice’s patent claims.56  As to 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit 
found that there was enough evidence that Toyota had an infringing 
equivalent structure that met the district court’s construction of the 
CTTU claim term.57  Specifically, Toyota’s system accepts inputs 
from multiple sources, i.e., input at the planetary gears from the ICE 
output shaft and input at the ring gear from the electric motor output 
shaft, and the CTTU is controlled to transfer variable amounts of 
torque, i.e., the microprocessor dictates the amount of torque sent 
from each input, and ultimately the amount of torque output to the 
drive shaft.58
                                                 
52 Id. at *18. 
 
53 Id. at *19. 
54 Id. 
55 See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
56 See id. at 1313 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[T]here is no single device or 
component in Toyota’s design that can be characterized as multi-input.”). 
57 See id. at 1307 (“This rebuttal testimony, in conjunction with the testimony given 
during each side’s case in chief, provided the jury with an ample basis upon which 
to evaluate the insubstantiality of the differences between the CTTU limitation and 
the accused structure.”). 
58 See id. at 1299–1300 (citation omitted) (“Toyota’s drive train is designed around 
a ‘planetary gear unit’ (or ‘power-splitting device’), having a central ‘sun’ gear that 
meshes with several ‘planetary gears’ . . . which in turn mesh with a peripheral ring 
gear . . . . [T]he output shaft from the ICE is connected to the planetary carrier (and 
thus to the planetary gears), whereas the output shaft from the MG2 is connected to 
the ring gear. . . . [A] microprocessor associated with Toyota’s drive train is able to 
control the amount of torque provided by both the ICE and MG2.”). 
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¶25  In addition, Paice appealed the district court’s ongoing 
royalty arrangement.59  At the Federal Circuit, Paice argued, inter 
alia, that the district court did not have the statutory authority to order 
an ongoing royalty.60  The Federal Circuit (Lourie and Prost, with 
Rader concurring in the result) disagreed and held that awarding an 
ongoing royalty for patent infringement in lieu of an injunction may 
be appropriate under some circumstances.61  However, the opinion 
cautioned that such relief should be awarded only when necessary to 
effectuate a remedy and is not justified “as a matter of course 
whenever a permanent injunction is not imposed.”62  In this regard, 
the Federal Circuit suggested that the district court allow the parties 
to negotiate a prospective license and would step in only to assess a 
reasonable royalty rate if the parties fail to agree.63
¶26 In a footnote, the opinion distinguished an ongoing royalty—
which the panel endorsed—from a compulsory license, which the 
panel said was not at issue.
 
64  The panel noted that a compulsory 
license permits anyone meeting certain criteria to use the licensed 
work or technology.65  An ongoing royalty, on the other hand, is 
limited to a particular set of defendants—here, those found to have 
infringed Paice’s patents—and is not available to other auto 
manufacturers.66
                                                 
59 Id. at 1296. 
  Perhaps the true distinction to be made is between 
60 Id. at 1314 (“Paice argues that the district court did not have the statutory 
authority to issue this order.”). 
61  Id. (“Under some circumstances, awarding an ongoing royalty for patent 
infringement in lieu of an injunction may be appropriate.”). 
62 Id. at 1315. 
63 See id. (“[W]here the district court determines that a permanent injunction is not 
warranted, the district court may wish to allow the parties to negotiate a license 
amongst themselves regarding future use of a patented invention before imposing 
an ongoing royalty.  Should the parties fail to come to an agreement, the district 
court could step in to assess a reasonable royalty in light of the ongoing 
infringement.”). 
64 See id. at 1313 n.13 (“We use the term ongoing royalty to distinguish this 
equitable remedy from a compulsory license.”). 
65 Id. (“The term ‘compulsory license’ implies that anyone who meets certain 
criteria has congressional authority to use that which is licensed.”).  
66 See id. (“By contrast, the ongoing-royalty order at issue here is limited to one 
particular set of defendants; there is no implied authority in the court’s order for 
any other auto manufacturer to follow in Toyota’s footsteps and use the patented 
invention with the court’s imprimatur.”). 
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an open compulsory license available to all and a limited compulsory 
license only available to the infringing party in suit. 
¶27 In his concurrence, Judge Rader highlighted the majority’s 
distinction as one of semantics and noted that “calling a compulsory 
license an ‘ongoing royalty’ does not make it any less a compulsory 
license.”67  Judge Rader also averred that he would have gone further 
than to merely suggest that the district court may allow the parties to 
negotiate a license before stepping into the fray.68  He would require 
the district court to remand the issue of an ongoing royalty to the 
parties, or at least obtain permission from both parties before setting 
an ongoing royalty.69
¶28 It was unclear as to how the district court arrived at the $25 
per vehicle figure,  and the panel was unable to determine whether 
the district court abused its discretion.
 
70  Accordingly, the case was 
remanded with an order to reevaluate the ongoing royalty rate.71
D. The District Court Raises the Royalty Rate 
 
¶29 On remand, the district court considered new evidence on 
damages, including an expert report by each party’s damages 
expert.72  The court ordered the rate increased to approximately $98 
per infringing vehicle, or 0.48% on each Prius, 0.32% on each Toyota 
Highlander and 0.26% on each Lexus RX400h.73
                                                 
67 Id. at 1316 (Rader, J., concurring). 
  The court’s final 
calculation was based on the application of a 25% “rule of thumb” to 
Toyota’s profit margin of 9%, which yields an initial figure of 
68 See id. (citation omitted) (“[T]his court should do more than suggest that ‘the 
district court may wish to allow the parties to negotiate a license amongst 
themselves . . . before imposing an ongoing royalty.’”) . 
69 See id. (“[T]his court should require the district court to remand this issue to the 
parties, or to obtain the permission of both parties before setting the ongoing 
royalty rate itself.”). 
70 Id. at 1315. 
71 Id. 
72 Before stepping in to reset the ongoing royalty rate, the court allowed the parties 
to go through mediation and exhaust their efforts to set a rate themselves.  See 
Paice, LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623 (E.D. Tex. 2009) 
(“[T]he Court has given the parties full and fair opportunity to set their own 
ongoing royalty rate. . . . Unfortunately, the parties were unable to reach an 
agreement.”). 
73 See Paice, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 630–31. 
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2.25%.74  The court then reduced that figure by one-third to 1.5%, 
guided by past damage awards and because Toyota makes less profit 
on its hybrid vehicles than on its non-hybrids.75  Finally, the court 
excluded the value of the ICE from the royalty base because it is not a 
core component of Paice’s invention.76  Taking 1.5% of $6,500 (the 
value of the hybrid drive train less the ICE, as determined by one of 
the damages experts), the court arrived at the ongoing royalty rate of 
$98 per vehicle.77
¶30 The court decided to raise the rate for several reasons.  
First, Toyota is now an adjudged infringer, and this change affects the 
damages calculus by altering the post-judgment negotiating positions 
of the parties.
 
78  Moreover, the court noted that Toyota’s continued 
infringement post-verdict is willful, and any new lawsuit could result 
in the imposition of treble damages.79  The court further observed that 
higher oil and gas prices have made Paice’s hybrid technology more 
valuable and increased Toyota’s hybrid sales.80  In addition, 
producing hybrid vehicles allows Toyota to meet the heightened U.S. 
fuel efficiency standards,81 and the popularity of the infringing 
vehicles has enhanced Toyota’s reputation as a green company.82
                                                 
74 Id. at 630. 
 
75 Id. 
76 Id.  
77 Id 
78 See id. at 630 (“[T]he law must ensure that an adjudged infringer who voluntarily 
chooses to continue his infringing behavior must adequately compensate the patent 
holder for using the patent holder’s property. . . . The Court . . . takes into account 
the changed legal and factual circumstances occurring since the first hypothetical 
negotiation.”); see also id. at 624 (“Once a judgment of validity and infringement 
has been entered . . . the calculus is markedly different because different economic 
factors are involved.”).   
79 Id. at 626 (footnote omitted) (“Toyota never considers the fact that its 
continued infringement is willful and that a new lawsuit by Paice would likely 
result in treble damages and could potentially be considered an exceptional 
case.”). 
80 See id. at 628 (citations omitted) (“Paice contends, and the Court agrees, that 
higher oil and gas prices make the fuel efficiency advantages of the Paice 
technology even more valuable.  The rise in gasoline prices has significantly 
increased Toyota’s hybrid sales.”). 
81 Id. at 629 (“[T]here is little doubt that Toyota’s offering of hybrid vehicles helps 
it meet the CAFE standards.”). 
82 Id. (citation omitted) (“Toyota’s dominance in the hybrid industry and the 
popularity of its infringing vehicles have enhanced Toyota’s reputation as a ‘green’ 
company.”). 
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E. eBay and Paice Bode Well for Toyota… 
¶31 Although Toyota is saddled with an ongoing royalty until the 
‘970 patent term expires in 2011, and the rate was ultimately 
quadrupled, the judgment circumvented a potentially serious 
disruption of Toyota’s business and permits the current stream of 
popular hybrid vehicles to continue flooding our roads and reducing 
our carbon emissions.  At the same time, it provides Paice with a 
reliable revenue stream as compensation for its innovation.  The 
income can fund its development of hybrid vehicle systems, and the 
advanced technology will presumably be available to Toyota and 
other implementers of hybrid vehicles to license. 
¶32 The eBay and Paice precedents will undoubtedly continue to 
affect the production of Toyota’s hybrid vehicles as the automaker 
has been targeted again by Paice, in the Eastern District of Texas, and 
by another NPP wielding hybrid vehicle patents.  In July of 2007, 
while the initial lawsuit was still pending, Paice filed a second suit 
against Toyota asserting three patents, including the ‘970 Patent.  In 
this suit, Paice alleged that the Toyota Camry hybrid infringes the 
‘970 patent and that the second generation Prius, the Highlander 
SUV, the Lexus RX400h SUV, the Camry hybrid and two additional 
Lexus models infringe the ‘970 patent as well as U.S. Patent 
Nos. 7,104,347 and 7,237,634.83
¶33 In July 2009, Paice filed a Second Amended Complaint, 
which dropped allegations that the two Lexus models infringed the 
’970 patent.  According to the amended pleading, Paice had entered 
into a covenant not to assert the ’970 patent against the Lexus 
GS450h and the Lexus LS600h.
   
84
¶34 The ink had barely dried on U.S. Patent No. 7,392,871 (’871 
Patent) when Paice again accused Toyota of infringement.
  As of the date of this writing, 
Paice’s other allegations appear to be going forward.   
85
                                                 
83 See First Amended Complaint at 4–5, Paice, LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. 
Supp. 2d 620 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 07-CV-180), 2007 WL 4826972 at *4–5. 
  The 
’871 patent issued on July 1, 2008, the same day Paice filed suit in 
the Eastern District of Texas.  The ’871 Patent is the latest addition to 
84 See Second Amended Complaint at 4, Paice, LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. 
Supp. 2d 620 (E.D. Texas 2009) (No. 07-cv-180-DF) 2007 WL 3188987 (July 22, 
2009). 
85 See generally Complaint at 3, Paice, LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 
2d 620 (E.D. Texas 2009) (No. 2:08-cv-261) 2004 WL 4908845 (July 1, 2004). 
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a family of patents that cover improvements to Paice’s ’970 
Patent.  The ’871 patent claims a hybrid vehicle having three AC 
electric motors each with an AC-DC converter.86  The ’871 Patent 
explains that providing three motors (one is a starting motor, the other 
two are traction motors) conveys mechanical and efficiency 
advantages, such as eliminating the need for a fore-and-aft driveshaft 
and allowing traction control to be centrally accomplished by a 
microprocessor.87  Paice’s complaint alleges that Toyota directly 
infringes the ’871 patent by making and selling the Highlander hybrid 
SUV and the Lexus RX400h hybrid SUV, and that the carmaker 
induces and contributes to infringement by encouraging others to 
operate the vehicles.88  Again, Paice asked the court for an 
injunction.89
¶35 An individual inventor recently brought another infringement 
suit against Toyota.  Conrad O. Gardner is a Washington State 
engineer, patent attorney and the named inventor on eight patents, 
several of which relate to hybrid vehicle technology.  Gardner 
recently sued Toyota in the Western District of Washington, accusing 
the automaker of infringing U.S. Patent No. 7,290,627 (‘627 Patent), 
entitled “Extended range motor vehicle having ambient pollutant 
processing” by manufacturing and selling the second generation 
Prius, the Camry and the Highlander.
 
90
¶36 The ‘627 Patent is directed to a hybrid vehicle control system 
which controls the relative contribution of driving force from an 
internal combustion engine and an electric motor by sensing the 
vehicle’s speed and transferring the driving force contributions 
accordingly.
   
91  Gardner’s Second Amended Complaint noted that the 
‘627 patent had an early priority date (based on a parent patent 
application filed in April 1992), more than two years before Toyota 
began investigating the development of a commercial hybrid 
automobile.92
                                                 
86 See U.S. Patent No. 7,392,871  col.56 l.42–67 (filed May 8, 2006). 
  
87 See id. at col.51 l.11–23. 
88 See Complaint for Patent Infringement, at 3, Gardner v. Toyota Motor Corp., 
2009 WL 4110305 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 19, 2009) (No. 2:08-CV-632), 2008 WL 
4520587. 
89 See id. at 4. 
90 See id. at 5. 
91 See U.S. Patent No. 7,290,627 col.2 l.54–col.3 l.28 (filed June 23, 1997). 
92 See Complaint for Patent Infringement, supra note 93, at 4–5. 
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¶37 Gardner accuses Toyota of having knowledge of his patented 
technology as early as January 1994.93  Specifically, the complaint 
alleges that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) cited a 
Gardner patent against one of Toyota’s hybrid technology patent 
applications during prosecution of Toyota’s applications.94
¶38 Toyota has made some headway in fighting Gardner’s 
infringement allegations.  In November 2009, the court granted 
Toyota’s motion for partial summary judgment, by which 
independent claim 6 of the ‘627 patent is invalidated for 
indefiniteness under Section 112, second paragraph.
 
95  This provision 
provides that patent claims must “particularly point[] out and 
distinctly claim[]” the subject matter of the invention.96  Claim 6 
recites an engine powering a vehicle at “high speeds” and a charging 
path for charging a battery at “lower speeds.”97  The claim later 
recites the term “said speed demands.”  The court held that the claim 
was indefinite because it was unclear as to which of the earlier recited 
speeds provide the antecedent basis for “said speed demands.”98
F. …and for Clean Technologies 
 
¶39 The market penetration of the Prius makes it an important 
early success in commercializing and popularizing emissions 
reduction technologies.  In the absence of eBay, this suite of district 
court patent infringement lawsuits targeting Toyota would be a 
serious threat to the positive environmental impact of the Prius.  
Instead, the Supreme Court’s decision on patent injunctions provides 
courts with the necessary flexibility to balance the interests of the 
NPP with the public interest.   
¶40 The Paice district court decision to deny injunctive relief 
illustrates this new flexible approach to patent injunctions.  In 
                                                 
93 See id. at 4–5.  
94 Id.  
95 See Gardner v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:08-CV-632, 2009 WL 4110305 (W.D. 
Wash. Nov. 19, 2009).  
96 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
97 U.S. Patent No. 7,290,627 at col.12 l.24–35 (filed June 23, 1997).   
98 See Gardner v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:08-CV-632, 2009 WL 4110305, at *6 
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 19, 2009) (“[T]he lack of express or implicit antecedent basis 
for the ‘said speed demands’ element, and the multiple competing constructions 
offered render the claim insolubly ambiguous. . . . [T]he Court finds claim 6 of the 
‘627 patent indefinite and therefore invalid.”). 
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crafting an appropriate remedy, the court was able to consider the 
parties’ concerns, such as Paice’s licensing efforts and Toyota’s 
research and development costs.  The court also weighed in on a 
fundamental patent damages question regarding the proportion of the 
vehicle represented by the components covered by the infringing 
claims.  Systemic concerns like the impact of an injunction on related 
businesses in Toyota’s network of dealers and suppliers were 
addressed, and even policy issues such as reducing American 
dependence on foreign oil entered the analysis.  Implementers of 
clean technologies have the freedom, under eBay, to have their 
concerns heard by the court and to submit public interest arguments 
relating to climate change.  With regard to these considerations, the 
parties’ concerns can be heard fully, and the court can weigh more 
information in order to reach the right result. 
¶41 Furthermore, an award of an ongoing royalty, permissible 
after the Federal Circuit Paice decision, is an additional remedial tool 
that district courts have at their disposal as an alternative to an 
injunction.  With this equitable discretion, the district court can 
maintain a de facto technology transfer arrangement that has allowed 
the deployment of beneficial clean technologies.  The court can set a 
reasonable price term for an arrangement in which the parties may be 
unwilling or unable to reach an agreement.   
¶42 Not only do eBay and Paice improve the results of litigation; 
they may reduce the number of infringement actions brought by NPPs 
or bring early ends to such suits by encouraging parties to reach 
agreements on licensing.  From the perspective of the NPPs, litigation 
may be a less attractive option.  Permanent injunctions are much less 
likely, and NPPs’ biggest stick has been eliminated.  Nevertheless, 
the possibility of a court-awarded ongoing royalty may provide new 
incentive for both clean tech implementers and NPPs to devote 
appropriate time and energy to negotiating their own licensing terms.  
The prospect of a court determining and imposing its own royalty rate 
on litigants, sua sponte, could provide a powerful incentive for the 
parties to settle out of court. 
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G. Clean Tech NPPs Running to the Border? 
¶43 There is, however, at least one exception to this positive trend 
—clean tech NPPs seeking exclusion orders from the ITC.99  The 
eBay decision has made the ITC a particularly attractive forum for 
NPPs because the new law of patent injunctions imposed by eBay 
does not apply to ITC actions.100
¶44 Indeed, Paice looked to this forum to escape the effects of 
eBay and get injunctive relief.  After the district court denied granting 
an injunction, and after the Federal Circuit affirmed the court-
imposed ongoing royalty, Paice turned its attention to the ITC.  The 
strategy proved successful as Toyota ultimately agreed to license 
Paice’s entire portfolio of patented technologies.
  ITC actions are not Title 35 cases; 
the ITC is governed by 19 U.S.C. § 1337.  Accordingly, the ITC may 
impose injunctive relief in the form of an exclusion order, i.e., a ban 
on importation of infringing products into the U.S., without analyzing 
the equitable injunction factors.  As a result of losing the stick of the 
injunction in district courts, some NPPs are turning to the ITC to 
regain the upper hand with the threat of an exclusion order.   
101  In September 
2008, Paice filed a complaint with the ITC, asking the agency to 
investigate whether Toyota’s importation of the third generation 
Prius, the Camry Hybrid, and the Lexus HS250h and RX450h 
(Accused Products) infringes the ‘970 Patent.  Paice is requesting a 
permanent limited exclusion order barring importation of the Accused 
Products into the U.S.102
¶45 According to the ITC complaint, Toyota made judicial 
admissions, in the form of discovery responses and stipulations in the 
prior district court actions, that the drive trains of the Accused 
   
                                                 
99 The U.S. International Trade Commission is a federal agency that investigates 
trade and importation issues, including conducting quasi-judicial proceedings 
involving alleged infringement of intellectual property rights by importation of 
accused products pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337. 
100 See, e.g., In re Certain Hybrid Electric Vehicles and Components Thereof, 337-
TA-688, Order No. 12 at 11 (U.S.I.T.C. May 21, 2010) (internal citations omitted) 
(on file with author).  
101 See Joann Muller, Toyota Settles Hybrid Patent Case, FORBES.COM (July 19, 
2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/19/toyota-prius-paice-severinsky-business-
autos-hybrid.html (“Terms of the settlement weren’t disclosed, but Paice’s 
chairman, Frances M. Keenan, said Toyota had agreed to license all 23 of Paice’s 
patents, not just the one at issue in the ITC claim.”). 
102 See Complaint at ¶ 54, In re Certain Hybrid Electric Vehicles and Components 
Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-688 (Sep. 3, 2009).  
2010 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 013 
Products are materially the same as those found to infringe the ‘970 
Patent.103  Moreover, Paice asserted that Toyota should be precluded 
from challenging the infringement, validity and enforceability of the 
‘970 Patent because those issues were “fully and finally litigated 
against Toyota” in the district court, giving rise to collateral 
estoppel.104  Paice further asserted that res judicata also precludes 
Toyota from challenging the validity and enforceability of the ‘970 
Patent because the Accused Products are materially identical to the 
vehicles held to infringe Paice’s patent in the district court case.105
¶46 In November 2009, Paice moved for summary determination 
on the issues of infringement, validity and enforceability on the 
grounds of collateral estoppel and res judicata.
 
106  In a response 
issued in December 2009, the ITC’s investigative staff agreed with 
Paice and supported its motion.107  The response noted that, although 
the Accused Products are different from those at issue in the federal 
court case, Toyota admitted that the Accused Products’ hybrid drive 
trains are materially the same as those found to infringe in that 
lawsuit.108
¶47 Everything seemed to fall into place for Paice in the ITC 
action.  In March 2010, the ALJ presiding over the case granted 
Paice’s motion for summary determination that the Accused Products 
infringe the ‘970 Patent.
   
109
                                                 
103 See id. at ¶ 25.  
  The same decision denied Toyota’s 
motion to terminate the investigation based on the doctrine of claim 
104 See id. at ¶¶ 48–53.  
105 See id.  
106 See Paice’s Motion for Summary Determination Regarding Infringement, 
Validity and Enforceability, In re Certain Hybrid Electric Vehicles and 
Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-688 (Nov. 25, 2009). 
107 See Response of the Commission Investigative Staff to Complainant’s Motion 
for Summary Determination Regarding Infringement, Validity and Enforceability, 
In re Certain Hybrid Electric Vehicles and Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 
337-TA-688 (Dec. 22, 2009) (on file with author). 
108 See id. at 8 (“[A]lthough the models at issue in this investigation (the Toyota 
Camry Hybrid, Prius III, Lexus RX450h, and Lexus HS250h) were not at issue in 
Paice I, these models are materially the same as the Adjudicated Products in Paice 
I.   Indeed, Toyota admits that ‘the hybrid drive trains of the Toyota Camry Hybrid, 
Toyota Prius Generation III Hybrid, Lexus RX450h, and Lexus HS250h are 
materially the same as those of the Lexus RX400h and Toyota Highlander Hybrid 
[Adjudicated Products].’”). 
109 See Certain Hybrid Elec. Vehicles & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-
688, USITC Order No. 6 (Mar. 3, 2010) (completed). 
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preclusion,110 though Toyota was subsequently permitted to renew 
this motion.111  Shortly thereafter, the ALJ also granted Paice’s 
motion for summary determination that issue preclusion barred 
Toyota from challenging the validity of the ‘970 Patent.112  The ALJ 
rejected Toyota’s argument that it should be able to challenge the 
validity of the ‘970 Patent because the Supreme Court’s KSR v. 
Teleflex decision on the legal analysis for obviousness constituted a 
change in the law that triggered an exception to issue preclusion.113
¶48 Finally, in what was perhaps the straw that broke the camel’s 
back, the ALJ denied Toyota’s renewed motion for summary 
determination that the ITC investigation was barred by claim 
preclusion.
  
114   This doctrine prevents relitigation of a prior claim, 
including issues that were or could have been raised in a previously 
decided action, unless an exception to the rule applies.115  Toyota 
asserted that the ITC investigation involved the same claim as the 
prior district court litigation between the parties and that no exception 
to claim preclusion applies.116
                                                 
110 Id. 
  The motion turned on whether Paice 
111 See Certain Hybrid Electric Vehicles and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA-688, USITC Order No. 12 (May 21, 2010) (completed) (“On April 6, 2010, the 
ALJ held a telephone conference with the parties discussing the Commission 
Opinion and, inter alia, whether Toyota could renew its motion for summary 
determination terminating the investigation based on claim preclusion.  On that 
same day, the ALJ notified the parties via e-mail that he would permit Toyota to 
renew its motion.”). 
112 See Certain Hybrid Electric Vehicles and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA-688, USITC Order No. 11 (May 21, 2010) (“[T]he ALJ GRANTS Paice’s 
motion for summary determination that the ‘970 Patent is valid as Toyota is barred 
under issue preclusion from relitigating the validity of the ‘970 Patent.”).  
113 See id. at 7–8 (“[T]he Supreme Court did not change the law on obviousness, but 
rather emphasized that the law did not require a specific TSM test, rather that the 
law was constant from Graham forward.”). 
114 See Certain Hybrid Electric Vehicles and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA-688, USITC Order No. 12 at 13  (May 21, 2010) (completed) (“[T]he ALJ finds 
that Paice’s claim is not precluded because an exception to claim preclusion applies 
in this investigation.  Toyota’s motion for summary determination terminating this 
investigation is hereby DENIED.”). 
115 See id. at 8 (“Under the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion, ‘[a] final 
judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from 
relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.’ . . . Claim 
preclusion will not apply to extinguish the entire claim, however, if an exception to 
the rule exists.”) (internal citations omitted). 
116 See id. at 4 (“Toyota argues that all of the parties acknowledge that the instant 
investigation involves the same ‘claim’ as the prior district court litigation because 
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was unable “to seek a certain remedy or form of relief” in the district 
court litigation that was available with the ITC.117
¶49 The ALJ held that Paice was not precluded from pursuing the 
ITC investigation because the exception relating to available 
remedies applied in this instance.
  If this exception 
applied, then the ITC investigation could not be barred by claim 
preclusion. 
118  The ALJ found meaningful 
differences between the relief provided by an exclusion order from 
the ITC and that of a permanent injunction that was available to Paice 
in the district court action.119  The bases for the two remedies differ 
significantly.  An exclusion order is a trade remedy intended to 
protect U.S. industries from unfair importation practices and is 
directed at infringing products, whereas injunctive relief flows from a 
patentee’s right to exclude and targets infringing parties.120  The ALJ 
also noted that the U.S. trade statute contemplated that ITC 
investigations would provide relief to patent holders in addition to the 
remedies provided under the Patent Act.121
                                                                                                             
there is no dispute that the Accused Products, namely the Toyota Prius III, Toyota 
Camry Hybrid, Lexus RX450h and the Lexus HS250h, are ‘essentially the same’ as 
the Adjudicated Products and that differences between them are merely colorable.  
Therefore, since the claim is the ‘same,’ Paice is precluded from this investigation 
unless an exception to claim preclusion applies.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 
117 Id. at 9 (“The focus of the inquiry is whether the relief provided by an exclusion 
order is a ‘certain remedy or form of relief’ that was not available in the district 
court.”). 
118 See id. (“The ALJ finds that while Paice’s claim in the instant investigation is 
based on the same ‘claim’ as in Paice I, Paice is not precluded from pursuing the 
instant investigation because an exception to the general rule of claim preclusion 
applies in this investigation, namely that Paice was unable to seek ‘a certain remedy 
or form of relief’ in the district court.”). 
119 See id. (“[T]he relief provided by an exclusion order and that of a permanent 
injunction are meaningfully different.”). 
120 See id. at 9-11 (“The bases for these remedies are significantly different:  
remedies provided under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 are trade remedies 
intended to protect domestic industries from unfair importation practices, while 
injunctive relief under Section 283 of the Patent Act is an equitable remedy based 
on a patentee’s rights under that statute. . . . [E]xclusion orders issued by the ITC 
are directed at the infringing products, regardless of the party seeking to import the 
goods.  In contrast, injunctions issued by district courts are directed at specific 
parties in the litigation.”) (internal citations omitted). 
121 See id. at 10 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1), “Section 337 investigations were 
specifically intended to provide relief to patent holders in addition to the relief 
provided under the Patent Act.”) 
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¶50 eBay indirectly supported the notion that an ITC exclusion 
order and a permanent injunction under the Patent Act are materially 
different remedies.  In a 2007 ITC opinion, the Commission stated 
that the ITC is not bound by the Supreme Court decision.122  The ALJ 
cited this opinion and drew additional support from its explanation 
that the patent injunction analysis is different from that for an 
exclusion order.123
¶51 Just a couple of months after the ALJ denied Toyota’s motion 
on claim preclusion and allowed Paice to pursue the ITC 
investigation, Toyota decided it had had enough.  In July 2010, the 
parties announced that they had settled their patent disputes.
  Thus, while the eBay decision tempered the effect 
of NPP suits in federal courts, highlighting the patent injunction 
analysis may have indirectly bolstered the right of NPPs that fail to 
win injunctive relief in court to pursue an exclusion order with the 
ITC. 
124
The parties agree that, although certain Toyota vehicles have been 
found to be equivalent to a Paice patent, Toyota invented, designed 
and developed the Prius and Toyota’s hybrid technology independent 
of any inventions of Dr. Severinsky and Paice as part of Toyota’s long 
history of innovation.
  
Although the terms of the agreement are confidential, the reports and 
statements by individuals involved reveal two interesting elements of 
the deal.  First, a compromise statement in a PR Newswire article 
gently notes Toyota’s infringement of the ‘970 Patent on the one 
hand and its independent development of the technology on the other: 
125
¶52 Second, and more importantly, Toyota took a license to 
Paice’s entire patent portfolio.  The chair of Paice’s board, Frances 
M. Keenan, confirmed that “Toyota had agreed to license all 23 of 
 
                                                 
122 See id. at 11 (citing Certain Baseband Processors, 337-TA-543, 2007 LEXIS 621 
at *102, n.230 (June 19, 2007) (“[T]he Commission has stated that it is not required 
to follow the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange LLC”)). 
123 See id. (“The Commission [in Certain Broadband Processors] explained how 
the analysis for whether a patentee is entitled to an injunction is different from 
determining whether a patentee is entitled to an exclusion order.  Thus, relief under 
Section 337 is not the same as injunctive relief in district courts.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
124 Toyota and Paice Reach Settlement of Patent Disputes, PR NEWSWIRE (July 19, 
2010), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/toyota-and-paice-reach-
settlement-of-patent-disputes-98757134.html. 
125 Id. 
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Paice’s patents, not just the one at issue in the ITC claim.”126  The last 
patent under license will expire in 2019.127
¶53 With its ITC action, Paice was able to successfully enter into a 
licensing agreement with Toyota.  Furthermore, eBay and Paice may 
be contributing to the steady stream of out-of-court settlements and 
licensing arrangements in another clean tech subsector: LEDs. 
   
III. LITIGIOUS LED PROFESSOR  
¶54 Another clean tech sub-sector that has seen significant NPP 
litigation in both federal court and the ITC is energy-efficient lighting 
products, particularly LEDs.  The sheer ubiquity of LEDs may be one 
reason for this; LEDs are used by the billions in a wide array of 
applications, from instrument panels to traffic lights to cell phones, as 
an energy-efficient substitute for incandescent bulbs.  Thus, there are 
a tremendous number and diversity of products in disparate sectors to 
target for infringement suits. 
¶55 LEDs have many advantages over standard incandescent light 
bulbs, including much greater energy efficiency.  LEDs are 
substantially more efficient than incandescents because they produce 
more light per watt than standard bulbs and radiate very little heat, a 
major source of wasted energy in incandescents.128  Another 
efficiency advantage comes from the ability of LEDs to emit light of 
a particular color without the use of color filters, which are required 
by traditional lighting sources for colored light and can compromise 
efficiency.129
¶56 The most litigious NPP in this field is Columbia University 
Professor Emeritus Gertrude Neumark Rothschild.  Professor 
Rothschild is a renowned LED innovator and the sole named inventor 
 
                                                 
126 See Joann Muller, Toyota Settles Hybrid Patent Case, FORBES.COM (July 19, 
2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/19/toyota-prius-paice-severinsky-business-
autos-hybrid.html (“Terms of the settlement weren’t disclosed, but Paice’s 
chairman, Frances M. Keenan, said Toyota had agreed to license all 23 of Paice’s 
patents, not just the one at issue in the ITC claim.”). 
127 See Hilary Russ, Toyota, Paice Resolve Patent Battle Over Hybrids, LAW360 
(July 19, 2010), http://ip.law360.com/articles/181844. 
128 See generally Solid-State Lighting: Using Light-Emitting Diodes, U.S. DEPT. 
OF ENERGY, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/ssl/using_leds.html (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2010).  
129 Light-emitting diode, WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light-emitting_diode (last visited Aug. 28, 2010).  
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on U.S. Patent Nos. 4,904,618 (‘618 patent) and 5,252,499 (‘499 
patent), directed to methods of making LEDs capable of emitting 
shorter wavelength (e.g., green or blue) light.   
¶57 Rothschild’s patents address the problem of “doping” wide 
band gap semiconductor materials, an essential step in creating 
adequate conductance for the materials to function as LEDs.130  
Doping is a process by which impurities are added to a 
semiconductor to increase the number of free charge carriers.131
¶58 Rothschild began her patent enforcement activity in 2005 in 
the federal courts by targeting major firms that manufacture and sell 
LEDs and products that contain LEDs.  In 2005, Rothschild filed 
three separate patent infringement complaints against LED 
manufacturers Philips Lumileds (Philips), Cree, Inc. (Cree) and 
Osram GmbH (Osram) in the Southern District of New York, 
alleging infringement of the ‘618 and ‘499 patents.     
  
Rothschild’s technology has had a major impact on LEDs by making 
production of green, blue and other short wavelength LEDs more 
economically viable. 
¶59 Professor Rothschild has also been litigating through the ITC.  
In February 2008, she filed a complaint with the ITC, alleging that 
several electronics giants—like Hitachi, LG Electronics, Matsushita, 
Motorola, Nokia, Samsung, Sony and Toshiba—infringed the ‘499 
patent.  In March 2009, she filed a second complaint with the ITC, 
accusing six more electronics companies, based in China and Taiwan, 
of infringing the ‘499 patent. 
A. Settlement Success Spurred by eBay and Paice? 
¶60 Professor Rothschild has had tremendous success in securing 
licensing agreements from accused infringers.132
                                                 
130 See U.S. Patent No. 4,904,618 col.1 l.9–17; see generally Doping 
(semiconductor), WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doping_(semiconductor) (last visited Aug. 28, 
2010).  
  Some of this 
131 Doping (semiconductor), WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doping_(semiconductor) (last visited Aug. 28, 
2010). 
132 According to her attorney, Rothschild has reached settlements or licensing 
agreements with more than 40 companies generating more than $27 million.  
Peter Clarke, Mitsubishi deal brings professor’s LED patent haul to $27 million, 
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success was undoubtedly attributable to the seminal innovations that 
her patents protect and some favorable rulings.  However, it is 
important to note that much of Professor Rothschild’s licensing 
activity has come despite the substantially reduced threat of an 
injunction after eBay.  Perhaps some of the accused infringers who 
took licenses from Professor Rothschild—some of whom did so 
shortly after the Paice decisions ordered and endorsed a court-
imposed ongoing royalty—preferred to negotiate their own licensing 
price term rather than have the court do it for them. 
¶61 The Osram, Philips, and Epistar settlements are notable for 
their timing in this regard.  Osram and Rothschild settled their lawsuit 
in October 2006,133 just three months after the Eastern District of 
Texas ordered Toyota to pay Paice an ongoing royalty of $25 per 
infringing vehicle.   Similarly, Philips reached a deal with Rothschild 
in March 2008,134 less than five months after the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s decision in Paice and endorsed its 
imposition of an ongoing royalty.  In May 2008, Taiwanese LED 
maker Epistar struck a deal with Rothschild without litigation.  Under 
the terms of the agreement, Rothschild granted Epistar a worldwide 
license to use the technology in the ‘618 and ‘499 patents.135
¶62  Philips may have been nudged to the negotiating table by an 
unfavorable claim construction decision.  The settlement followed the 
court’s decision granting in part Rothschild’s motion for 
reconsideration of its claim construction opinion.  In the court’s 
original opinion, it construed the term “doping . . . with . . . atomic 
hydrogen” to mean “incorporating atomic hydrogen not produced by 
disintegration of ambient gases.”
 
136
                                                                                                             
EETIMES (Nov. 6, 2009, 5:38 AM), 
http://www.eetimes.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=221600592. 
  However,  on reconsideration, 
the court found that its prior limiting construction of the term based 
133 Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, Rothschild v. Osram GmbH, 
No. 7:05-CV-5941 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2006). 
134 Sidley Announces Settlement of Patent Infringement Claims against LED 
Manufacturer, SIDLEY AUSTIN L.L.P. - NEWS & RESOURCES - NEWS & MEDIA 
(Mar. 10, 2008),  
http://www.sidley.com/newsresources/newsandpress/Detail.aspx?news=3511. 
135 Epistar Obtained a Worldwide License from Professor Gertrude Neumark 
Rothschild, EPISTAR PRESS RELEASE (May 8, 2008), 
http://www.epistar.com.tw/rptreport/2008-05-08%20press%20release.pdf.  
136 Rothschild v. Cree, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33134, at *45 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 
2007).  
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on statements by the patentee during the application process, was in 
error and revised it to mean “doping with atomic hydrogen (from any 
source).”137
¶63 Of the federal court defendants, Cree battled the longest.   
Rothschild alleged that the North Carolina LED maker’s methods of 
producing gallium nitride and aluminum gallium nitride LEDs 
infringe the ‘618 and ‘499 patents.
  This broadening of the claim term may have 
strengthened Rothschild’s infringement case and encouraged Philips 
to settle.  
138  The court denied Cree’s 
motion for summary judgment that it did not infringe one of 
Rothschild’s patents because the court determined that the preamble 
of an asserted patent claim should not be part of the infringement 
analysis.139
¶64 The preamble of claim 10, the only asserted independent 
claim of the ‘499 patent, claims a “method of forming a low 
resistivity semiconductor from a wide band-gap semiconductor 
substrate that has a tendency to become compensated when it is 
doped[.]”
 
140  Cree tried to dispose of the ‘499 patent on summary 
judgment by arguing that this preamble should be part of the 
infringement analysis, and that its production process does not 
infringe the patent because it does not include the elements of the 
preamble.141
¶65 Cree also contended that Rothschild waived her right to raise 
the issue of excluding the preamble from the infringement analysis 
because she failed to make that argument earlier in the case, and, in 
particular, remained silent about it during the court’s claim 
construction proceedings.
 
142
                                                 
137 Rothschild v. Cree, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48127, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 
2007)  
  The court disagreed, noting a lack of 
precedent on such waivers and that depriving Rothschild of the 
138 Complaint, Rothschild v. Cree, Inc., No. 05-CV-5939 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2005).  
139 Rothschild v. Cree, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 572, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  
140 Id. at 574–75.  
141 Id. at 575–76 (contending that its LED manufacturing process does not meet the 
limitation of “forming a low resistivity semiconductor from a wide band-gap 
semiconductor substrate” found in the preamble of claim 10 of the ‘499 patent).  
142 Id. at 576 (“Cree further argues that, by her long delay in raising the issue [of the 
limiting effect of the preamble], plaintiff has waived her right to do so.”).  
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argument would cause her substantial prejudice, likely destroying her 
infringement claim against Cree.143
¶66 Generally, a claim’s preamble becomes part of the 
infringement analysis (i.e., the preamble is “limiting”) if it recites 
essential features of the invention.
 
144  Stated another way, if the body 
of the claim recites a structurally complete invention, the preamble is 
not necessary for a determination of infringement.145
¶67 The court found that the body of claim 10 adequately 
describes a complete process and that reference to the preamble is not 
necessary to supply any missing steps or make the claim body 
comprehensible.
 
146  Rather, the court determined that the preamble 
merely specifies a desirable result achieved by the process recited in 
the body of the claim, i.e., formation of a low-resistivity 
semiconductor from a wide-gap semiconductor substrate.147  
Accordingly, the court held that the preamble was not part of the 
infringement analysis.148  Because Cree’s non-infringement 
arguments hinged on elements of the preamble, the court denied the 
motion for summary judgment.149
¶68 The case was subsequently transferred to the District of 
Massachusetts,
   
150
                                                 
143 Id. at 576–77 (“[D]epriving plaintiff of the right to contend that the scope of 
Claim 10 of the ‘499 patent is not limited by its preamble would likely be fatal to 
her infringement claim against Cree . . . it would be an unconscionably harsh 
penalty for a procedural error that apparently caused Cree no more than minor 
inconvenience . . . the Court rules that plaintiff has not waived her right to contend 
that . . . the preamble does not limit the scope of the claim.”).  
 and in a recent decision, Rothschild successfully 
144 See id. at 577 (citing Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 952–53 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006)).  
145 Id. at 578 (citing Poly-America, L.P. v. GSE Lining Tech., Inc., 383 F.3d 1303, 
1310 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A] preamble is not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a 
structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to 
state a purpose or intended use for the invention.’”)). 
146 Id. (“[T]he body of Claim 10 adequately describes a complete process; reference 
to the preamble is not necessary to supply missing steps or to render understandable 
and enabling any of the steps described.”). 
147 Id. (“[T]he preamble merely specifies the desirable result achieved by the 
process described in the body of the claim.”). 
148 Id. 
149 Rothschild, 567 F. Supp. 2d 572, 578–79.  
150 Rothschild v. Cree, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47223 at *12 (D. Mass. May 
13, 2010) (“This Court granted the motion and this case was transferred to the 
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fought off Cree’s attempts to invalidate the ‘618 and ‘499 patents,151 
but was unable to dispose of the charge that the patents failed to name 
a co-inventor.152  Cree finally settled with Rothschild in June of 
2010153 and the case was dismissed.154
¶69 Rothschild’s ITC actions have also spurred a string of 
settlements.  The ever-expanding list of respondents-cum-licensees 
includes Toshiba, Panasonic, Sony Ericsson, LG Electronics, 
Motorola, Samsung, Sanyo, Sharp, Philips Electronics, Xiamen, 
Tekcore, Tyntek, Arima, Lucky Light and Exceed Perseverance.  In 
November 2009, Mitsubishi took a license from Rothschild without 
litigation. 
 
¶70 Thus, like Toyota’s hybrid vehicles, the energy-efficient 
LEDs remain deployed and continue to reduce the carbon footprints 
of the products that use them.  This is because most of the LED and 
electronics manufacturers targeted by Rothschild have taken licenses 
that allow them to continue to produce their wares.  It is difficult to 
ascertain how much of a role eBay and Paice played in motivating 
Rothschild and her adversaries to negotiate settlements, but the new 
realities of these decisions established the backdrop for many of the 
Rothschild settlement agreements, and the current status of U.S. 
patent law under eBay and Paice encourages such agreements.  
IV. SMART GRID NPPS FIZZLE OUT  
¶71 As major utility companies across the U.S. deploy smart grid 
technology to manage the energy consumption of their customers, 
NPP patent infringement suits related to this clean tech subsector are 
filed with increasing frequency.  Both utilities rolling out smart grid 
systems and developers of the systems and components thereof, such 
                                                                                                             
United State[s] District Court for the District of Massachusetts by order dated 
January 19, 2010.”). 
151 See id. at *65 (“Since Cree did not satisfy this burden, its motion for summary 
judgment of invalidity of the ‘618 Patent due to lack of enablement is denied. . . . 
The Court also denies Cree’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity of the 
‘499 Patent.”). 
152 Id. at *123 (“Rothschild’s motion for partial summary judgment on Cree’s 35 
United States Code Section 102(f) defense . . . is denied.”). 
153 Notice of Motion and Joint Motion for Entry of Stipulation of Dismissal with 
Prejudice, Rothschild v. Cree, Inc., No. 10 -10133 (D. Mass. June 18, 2010). 
154 Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice; Order, Rothschild v. Cree, Inc., No. 10-
CV-10133 (D. Mass. June 29, 2010). 
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as smart meters, have been targeted in these cases.  Almost as quickly 
as these cases have appeared, however, at least one has fizzled out 
and another has seen a settlement agreement lead to dismissal of key 
defendants.  
¶72 Thomas David Petite is the named inventor on over twenty-
five U.S. patents relating to wireless communications technologies.  
Many of these patents are directed to energy applications.  Petite 
founded SIPCo, LLC (SIPCo) and IPCo, LLC, doing business as 
IntusIQ (“Intus”), and many of his patents are owned by one of these 
entities.  SIPCo and Intus have also taken charge of many wireless 
communications patents in the field issued to other inventors. 
¶73 Both SIPCo and Intus are technology licensing companies that 
seek to license their patents to firms that develop or implement 
wireless technologies for both energy and non-energy applications.  
SIPCo and Intus are particularly active in the energy and smart grid 
space.  According to the companies’ websites, Intus runs the 
“Essential Wireless Mesh” (EWM) program to “provide[] support for 
successful market entry” of licensees using the EWM patents and 
technology,155 and SIPCo is a “partnering member” of this “eco-
inventor-based organization.”156  In addition, SIPCo recently 
announced the launch of a Smartgrid Licensing Program.157
¶74 Though SIPCo and Intus have headed to court in two recent 
actions to enforce patents against two major utilities and a host of 
smart grid technology companies, like Paice and Rothschild, their 
impact on clean tech implementation has also been blunted by quick 
settlements. 
 
¶75 In January 2009, Intus sued ten companies involved in 
developing and implementing smart metering technologies.   The 
                                                 
155 Essential Wireless Mesh, INTUSIQ: YOUR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
RIGHTS MANAGEMENT COMPANY, http://www.myhousepliance.com/ (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2010). 
156 Home Page, SIPCO, http://sipcollc.com/Home_Page.html (“SIPCo LLC is a 
partnering member of ‘Essential Wireless MeshTM’ or EWMTM, an eco-inventor 
based organization run by IntusIQ which promotes the power of creating, 
developing and innovating solutions using wireless technology.”) (last visited Aug. 
28, 2010). 
157 Id. (“SIPCO LLC an EWM partner is pleased to announce its SMARTGRID 
LICENSING PROGRAM with ICAP Ocean Tomo.  The program was created in 
partnership with the utility companies request for a broadbased technology and 
IP license.”). 
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complaint, filed in the Eastern District of Texas, alleged infringement 
of two related patents directed to wireless network technology.158
¶76 The named defendants included Texas utility Reliant Energy 
(Reliant), Texas electric distribution and transmission company 
Oncor Electric Delivery Company (Oncor) and many smart meter and 
software companies such as Comverge, Sensus Metering Systems, 
Tantalus Systems, Tendril Networks and Trilliant Networks.  As of 
the date of this writing, court documents indicate that at least three 
defendants have settled their claims with Intus.  In May 2009, the 
court signed an order dismissing the claims against Oncor.
  
U.S. Patent Nos. 6,249,516 and 7,054,271 are entitled “Wireless 
network gateway and method for providing same” and are directed to 
wireless networks systems and servers for such systems that optimize 
the routes between each client and server.   
159  Two 
months later, similar orders were entered to dismiss the claims 
between Intus and defendants Reliant and Comverge.160
¶77 A second lawsuit, initiated by SIPCo, lasted just five months 
before the parties settled the case.  In July 2009, SIPCo sued Florida 
Power & Light Co. and FPL Group Inc. (collectively “FPL”) in U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging that the 
wireless network technology in the utility’s smart grid 
system infringed three SIPCo patents relating to smart grid 
technology.
 
161  According to the complaint, the allegedly infringing 
technology was used as part of the Energy Smart Miami initiative to 
implement smart grid technology in Miami-Dade County.162  SIPCo 
later filed an amended complaint that added smart grid solutions 
provider Silver Spring Network as a defendant.163
¶78 The family of patents-in-suit comprises U.S. Patent Nos. 
6,437,692, 7,053,767 and 7,468,661, each entitled “System and 
   
                                                 
158 Complaint, IP Co. v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., No. 2:09-CV-037 (E.D. Tex. 
Jan. 29. 2009). 
159 Order on Joint Motion to Dismiss, IP Co. v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., No. 2:09-
CV-37 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2009). 
160 Order, IP Co. v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., No. 2:09-CV-37 (S.D. Fla. July 22, 
2009). 
161 Complaint, Sipco, LLC v. Florida Power & Light Co., No. 1:09-CV-22209 (S.D. 
Fla. July 27, 2009). 
162 See id. at ¶¶ 16, 20. 
163 Amended Complaint, Sipco, LLC v. Florida Power & Light Co., No. 1:09-CV-
22209 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2009). 
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method for monitoring and controlling remote devices” (collectively 
“SIPCo patents”).  Petite is a named co-inventor on each patent. 
¶79 The SIPCo patents are directed to cost-effective methods and 
systems for collecting, formatting and monitoring data from remote 
devices.  According to the specifications of the SIPCo patents, the 
disclosed systems avoid the expense of installing and connecting 
local networks of sensors, actuators and controllers, as was 
previously done in control system solutions for distributed systems.  
The systems accomplish this by integrating local gateways with a 
wide area network, or WAN, which allows the server to host 
application specific software that previously had to be hosted in 
application specific local controllers.  The SIPCo patents explain: 
[T]he data monitoring and control devices of the present invention 
need not be disposed in a permanent location as long as they remain 
within signal range of a system compatible transceiver that 
subsequently is within signal range of a local gateway interconnected 
through one or more networks to [the] server . . . . 
¶80 By early January 2010, the case was over.  The parties filed a 
joint dismissal in late December 2009 indicating that the parties had 
entered into a confidential settlement agreement, and the court issued 
a final order of dismissal on January 5, 2010.164  On January 3, 2010, 
SIPCo announced that Silver Spring had “taken a license to SIPCO’s 
Essential Wireless MeshTM patent portfolio.”165
¶81 While several defendants remain in the Intus suit, the rapid 
rate of settlements and dismissals in both cases have largely averted 
disruption of smart grid technology roll-outs and bode well for the 
continued deployment of these technologies in the future.  In a post-
eBay and post-Paice world, NPPs and their adversaries have powerful 
incentives to negotiate their own licensing agreements. 
 
 V. CONCLUSION 
¶82 Concurrent with the increasing level of urgency in deploying 
clean technologies to combat climate change is an increase in the 
                                                 
164 Final Order of Dismissal and Order Denying All Pending Motions as Moots, 
Sipco, LLC v. Florida Power & Light Co., No. 1:09-CV-22209 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 
2010). 
165 SIPCO NEWS, SIPCO HOME PAGE (Jan. 3, 2010), http://sipcollc.com (“SIPCO, 
LLC is pleased to announce that Silver Spring Networks, Inc. has taken a license to 
SIPCO’s Essential Wireless MeshTM patent portfolio.”). 
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number of patent infringement claims brought by NPPs.  Typically, 
these disputes involve products that have already achieved substantial 
market penetration.  The Supreme Court’s eBay decision, which 
reinstated the application of the traditional permanent injunction test 
in patent cases, and the Federal Circuit’s Paice decision, which 
endorsed court-imposed ongoing royalties following infringement 
verdicts, together provide courts with important tools in handling 
such clean tech NPP suits.  The reduced threat of an injunction and 
the new risk of a court-imposed ongoing royalty may stop such 
lawsuits before they begin by encouraging parties to negotiate among 
themselves and reach licensing agreements out of court.  
Alternatively, should the parties litigate to trial, the courts now have 
the flexibility to weigh all relevant factors, including the parties’ 
concerns and public policy considerations relating to climate change.  
These developments also may drive clean tech NPPs to litigate in the 
ITC, where the remedy of an exclusion order is available.  Such cases 
could adversely affect implemented clean technologies.  Overall, 
however, these trends and tools are likely to reduce the instances of 
clean tech NPP litigation in federal courts and help the courts reach 
the right results when lawsuits do arise, and are therefore likely to 
keep deployed clean technologies working to combat climate change. 
 
